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Abstract
In this paper, an efficient arbitrated quantum signature scheme is proposed by combining quantum
cryptographic techniques and some ideas in classical cryptography. In the presented scheme, the
signatory and the receiver can share a long-term secret key with the arbitrator by utilizing the key
together with a random number. While in previous quantum signature schemes, the key shared
between the signatory and the arbitrator or between the receiver and the arbitrator could be used
only once, and thus each time when a signatory needs to sign, the signatory and the receiver
have to obtain a new key shared with the arbitrator through a quantum key distribution protocol.
Detailed theoretical analysis shows that the proposed scheme is efficient and provably secure.
Keywords: quantum signature, provable security, quantum cryptography, classical cryptography
1. Introduction
Depending on fundamental quantum-mechanical laws, quantum cryptography can provide un-
conditional security for communication. The idea of applying quantum mechanics to cryptography
was first introduced by Wiesner in the 1970s [1]. Bennett and Brassard developed the idea by
proposing a famous quantum key distribution protocol in 1984 [2]. Afterwards, various kinds
of quantum cryptographic protocols were extensively studied, such as quantum key distribution
(QKD) [2, 3, 4], quantum secret sharing (QSS) [5, 6], quantum authentication (QA) [7], quantum
bit commitment (QBC) [8, 9], quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [10] and quantum
signature (QS) [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Among of them, quantum key distribution has
been shown to be unconditional secure in both theory and experiment [20, 21, 22].
Digital signature, as an electronic equivalent of hand-written signature, is an essential cryp-
tographic primitive and particularly useful in electronic commerce. A valid digital signature can
be used to authenticate the identity of the originator, ensure data integrity, and provide non-
repudiation service. Most classical signature schemes are designed based on certain unproven
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computational assumptions, such as the infeasibility of factoring large integers and solving dis-
crete logarithm. However, quantum computation makes the infeasibility not exist any more [23].
Fortunately, QS, whose security relies on quantum-mechanical laws rather than computational
assumptions, promises to provide an alternative to classical signature.
In recent years, some progress has been made on QS. Gottesman and Chuang proposed a QS
scheme based on quantum one-way function, which is unconditionally secure even against quantum
attacks [11]. However, the scheme is not efficient as signing an m-bit message uses up O(m) qubits
of the public key. In [12], Zeng and Keitel presented an arbitrated QS scheme utilizing correlation
of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states and quantum one-time pad. Afterwards, Li et
al. found that the GHZ states used in [12] could be replaced by Bell states and proposed a more
efficient QS scheme [13]. Nevertheless, Zou et al. showed both the two schemes proposed in [12] and
[13] can be repudiated by the receiver Bob [14]. In [15], two arbitrated QS schemes with message
recovery were proposed by Lee et al, but the two schemes do not use entanglement features [24]
and thus the security is compromised to some extent [25]. In [16, 17], Lu¨ and Feng presented two
arbitrated QS schemes which could sign unknown quantum states using quantum stabilizer codes.
Wang et al. designed arbitrated QS with message recovery [18] and arbitrated QS with appendix
[19] without using entangled states, thus the efficiency is improved. Besides, true QS [26] and other
QS with special properties [27, 28, 29] also have been developed a little, and they are still not as
matured as their classical counterparts.
A common problem of all the above mentioned arbitrated QS schemes [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19] is that they do not consider how to reuse the shared key between the signatory and the
arbitrator or between the receiver and the arbitrator. Each time when a signatory needs to sign,
he has to obtain a new key shared with the arbitrator through QKD protocols [2, 3, 4], and thus
efficiency of QS schemes would be considerably decreased. In this paper, we propose an arbitrated
QS scheme based on the work about three-party authenticated QKD [30] presented by Hwang et
al. Efficiency of the proposed scheme is greatly improved in the following four aspects: classical
messages of arbitrary length can be signed by employing hash function to encode the message into
quantum information of fixed length; comparing quantum states is unnecessary; only von Neumann
measurement is required; the signatory and the receiver can share a long-term secret key with the
arbitrator. In addition, detailed theoretical analysis on the security of the scheme is given, and
particularly its existential unforgeability is proved formally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some basic knowledge about QS and notations
are presented in Sec. 2. Then, the arbitrated QS scheme is described in Sec. 3 and its security and
efficiency analysis is given in Sec. 4. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Sec. 5.
2. Preliminaries
To facilitate discussion of this paper, we briefly depict basic knowledge about QS and define
some notations. QS, as an analogy to manuscript signature and classical signature, should has
2
the ability to authenticate the identity of the originator and convince that the original content of
the signed message is kept unchanged. Any secure quantum signature scheme should satisfy the
following two basic requirements even if powerful quantum cheating strategies exist: the attacker
(or the malicious receiver) cannot forge the signature and disavowal of the signatory is impossible.
Generally, QS can be divided into two categories: arbitrated QS and true QS. In the arbitrated
QS, a trusted third party named arbitrator plays an importance role throughout the procedure,
such as performing preprocess and helping receivers verify the signature. While in the true QS,
the arbitrator is necessary only when there are disagreements or disputes between the signatory
and the receiver.
Some notations are defined as follows.
• Ux: the k-bit identity of a participant x. UA, UB , and Ua represent the identity of Alice, Bob
and the arbitrator, respectively.
• P : an arbitrary-length message string.
• rx ∈R {0, 1}
l: an l-bit string randomly chosen by the participant Ux.
• Kx: the secret key of length 2l shared between the arbitrator and the participant Ux.
• h(k,m): the keyed hash function {0, 1}l × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m such as that in [31, 32], where
k is a l-bit random string used as a temporary key and m is a string of arbitrary length.
• Trucl(Kx): the first l bits of the key Kx, where l = m+ k.
• str1||str2: concatenation of two strings str1 and str2.
• str1 ⊕ str2: the bitwise exclusive OR operation between two strings str1 and str2.
3. The proposed arbitrated QS scheme
The presented arbitrated QS scheme involves three parties, signatory Alice, receiver Bob, and
the arbitrator, and includes the following three phases.
• Initializing phase:
Alice shares the 2l-bit secret key KA with the arbitrator through an unconditionally secure
QKD protocol (one can choose a protocol from the ones proposed in [2, 3, 4]), and Bob shares
the 2l-bit secret key KB with the arbitrator in the same way.
• Signing phase:
3
– Alice randomly chooses a number rA ∈R {0, 1}
l and calculates
RA = (Trucl(KA)⊕ rA)⊕ (h(rA, P )||UA).
Then Alice encodes rA||RA according to her secret key KA and generates her signature
|S〉A =MKA(rA||RA).
The concrete encoding method can be described with the following equation:
|S〉iA =


|0〉 if KiA = 0 and (rA||RA)
i = 0,
|1〉 if KiA = 0 and (rA||RA)
i = 1,
|+〉 if KiA = 1 and (rA||RA)
i = 0,
|−〉 if KiA = 1 and (rA||RA)
i = 1,
(1)
where KiA, (rA||RA)
i, and |S〉iA denote the i-th bit of KA, rA||RA, and |S〉A, separately.
– Alice sends the signature |S〉A and the message P to Bob. This step can be implemented
in two ways. One is to send |S〉A via quantum channel and P via classical channel, the
other is to convert classical message P into quantum message |P 〉 based on computa-
tional basis R = {|0〉, |1〉} and then send both |S〉A and |P 〉 through quantum channel.
In this paper we choose the first way considering implementation efficiency.
• Verifying phase:
– After Bob receives the signature |S〉A and the message P , he chooses a random number
rB ∈R {0, 1}
l and calculates
RB = (Trucl(KB)⊕ rB)⊕ (h(rB , UB)||UB).
According to the key KB , Bob encoded rB ||RB into quantum bit string
|y〉B =MKB(rB ||RB),
and the way of encoding is the same as that Alice used in the signing phase shown in
Eq. (1). Then Bob sends |S〉A, |y〉B , and P to the arbitrator.
– The arbitrator measures the received qubits |S〉A with a basis depending on the secret
key KA. For instance, if K
i
A = 0, the qubit |S〉
i
A is measured in the rectilinear basis
R = {|0〉, |1〉}, otherwise it is measured in the diagonal basis D = {|+〉, |−〉}. Once the
arbitrator obtains measurement outcomes r′A||R
′
A, he can get
h(rA, P )
′||U ′A = (Trucl(KA)⊕ r
′
A)⊕RA,
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and compute h(r′A, P ). Then the arbitrator can verify the authenticity of P and
the validity of the signature |S〉A by comparing h(r
′
A, P )||UA with h(rA, P )
′||U ′A. If
h(r′A, P )||UA 6= h(rA, P )
′||U ′A, the arbitrator considers the signature is fake and aborts
the protocol, otherwise believes in it and sets parameter µa = 1.
– Similarly, the arbitrator measures the received qubits |y〉B according to the secret key
KB and gains the measurement result r
′
B ||R
′
B . Then he calculate
h(rB , UB)
′||U ′B = (Trucl(KB)⊕ r
′
B)⊕R
′
B
and h(r′B , U
′
B). If h(r
′
B , U
′
B)||UB = h(rB , UB)
′||U ′B , the arbitrator randomly chooses a
number ra ∈R {0, 1}
l and calculates
Ra = (Trucl(KB)⊕ ra)⊕ (h(ra, P ||µa)||Ua).
Then the arbitrator calculates
|y〉a =MKB (ra||Ra)
and sends |S〉A, |y〉a, and P to Bob. If h(r
′
B , U
′
B)||UB 6= h(rB , UB)
′||U ′B , the arbitrator
considers Bob is dishonest and aborts further operations.
– Bob measures the qubits |y〉a by the secret key KB and gains r
′
a||R
′
a. If
h(r′a, P ||1)||Ua = (Trucl(KB)⊕ r
′
a)⊕R
′
a,
Bob believes in the arbitrator and accepts |S〉A as Alice’s signature of the message P ,
otherwise he considers Alice’s signature is fake and discards P and |S〉A.
4. Security and efficiency analysis
In this section, we will show that the proposed arbitrated QS scheme can satisfy the two basic
security properties and its efficiency is very high by comparing it with some typical arbitrated QS
schemes.
4.1. Security analysis
Security of the proposed scheme is guaranteed mainly by three points: 1) QKD generating
secure keys [2, 3, 4], 2) the quantum no-cloning theorem guaranteeing non-orthogonal states not
to be duplicated [33], and 3) the property of quantum undistinguishability ensuring that non-
orthogonal states cannot be identified during transmission [34]. In the following, we will show that
the proposed scheme is secure from three aspects.
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• Impossibility of forgery
Based on previous related work in [30, 31, 35, 36], we present Theorem 1 to show the proposed
QS scheme is not existentially forgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks [37].
The term that existential forgeability under an adaptive chosen-message attack fit to QS
can be defined by simulating a game between an attacker A and a challenger C. A QS
scheme includes the initializing phase, the signing phase, and the verifying phase. So three
algorithms, namely Longkeygen, Sign, and V erify, are used to represent implementation
processes of these three phases respectively.
– Long-term key generation: C produces KTU as the key shared by the arbitrator TC and
user U through the algorithm Longkeygen.
– Queries: A can ask signatures of at most qsig messages, P1, P2, · · · , Pqsig , and C provides
the corresponding signature |Si〉 = Sign(KTU , Pi) of each query Pi. Here A is allowed
to request signatures of messages which rely on previously asked messages and obtained
signatures. Other types of queries related to the specific scheme also can be asked.
– Output: If A can output a valid message-signature pair (Pk, |Sk〉), where
Pk /∈ {P1, P2, · · · , Pqsig}, V erify(Pk, |Sk〉) = V alid,
then A is considered to be the winner.
Two security definitions related to Theorem 1 are offered as follows.
– (ε, t, q, n) − weakly collision− resistant h: If an adversary that is not given the key k
used each time, is restricted to spend total time t on the attack and request hash values
of at most q messages chosen by himself, M1,M2, · · · ,Mq, length of each at most n,
cannot find messages M ′ and M satisfying h(k,M) = h(k,M ′) with probability greater
than ε. Note that the definition here is a little different from than that in [31] as the
task in the later case is finding collisions for compression function.
– (ε, t, qsig, qh, n) − secure QS: If an adversary that is limited to make signature queries
for at most qsig times and hash queries up to qh times of messages Pi(1 ≤ i ≤ qsig + qh)
of length at most n, cannot generate a valid signature of a message without being made
signature query with probability greater than ε in the time bound t, then the scheme is
regard to be a (ε, t, qsig, qh, n)− secure QS scheme.
Theorem 1. If the keyed hash function h is (ε′, t′, q, n)-weakly collision-resistant, then the
proposed QS scheme is an (ε, t, qsig, qh, n)-secure QS scheme, and ε, ε
′, t, and t′ satisfy
inequality
(1−
1
2n
) · ε ·
1
qsig + qh
≤ ε′,
where q ≤ qsig + qh, t
′ ≤ t+ q · Trn, Trn is the time for generating a random number.
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Basic idea for proving the above theorem is that if an adversary A can forge the signature, then
a challenger C can break the weak collision resistance property of h using the event, which
is contradict with the assumption that h is weakly collision-resistant. Detailed description of
the formal proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix part.
Note that the preshared secret key of the presented QS scheme is used together with a
random number, the receiver Bob will not obtain the same polarization qubits even though
the same message is signed again, and the quantum no-cloning theorem and the property
of quantum undistinguishablity make eavesdroppers unable to obtain significant information
from random quantum bit strings. Therefore, even if the secret key KA is used for several
times, the adversary A still cannot know the secret key KA and counterfeit Alice’s signature
of the message favorable to her.
• Impossibility of disavowal
When Alice and Bob have disputes on signature, they will turn to the arbitrator. If Alice
denies her signature, the arbitrator can confirm whether Alice has signed the message since
the information of Alice’s secret key KA is included in the signature |S〉A. Similarly, if Bob
disavows the signature received, the arbitrator also can assure that Bob has received the
signature |S〉A of the message P , because Bob needs assistance of the arbitrator to verify
whether the signature |S〉A is valid.
• Protection against on-line guessing attack
The on-line guessing attack is common during transmission of quantum states, but it still
not yet modeled by proper queries yet. In the attack, an attacker may intercept the qubit
sequence and deals with one qubit each time. For instance, the attacker intercepts the qubit
string, measures the qubit of certain position in a random basis and replaces it with a new
one based on the measurement outcome. Then, the modified qubit sequence is sent to the
participants. The attacker may infer the correct basis by observing the participant’s reaction.
If a negative reaction is observed (with a probability 1/4), s/he can get the basis definitely,
otherwise repeats the process on the same qubit in the next implementations until the basis
can be obtained with a large probability. For other qubits, the attacker adopts the similar
method. By doing this, the attacker may know all the used basis and the key KTU after some
rounds.
From the process of the on-line guessing attack, we know that the attacker needs much time
to carry out the attack for many times in order to break the QS scheme. So we can take
some measures to protect against the attack. For example, the number of failing executions
is restricted. Once the number exceeds a certain threshold value, the preshared key would
be updated.
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4.2. Efficiency analysis
Two factors are generally studied on efficiency of QS schemes [18]: 1) the ratio between the
number of signed message bits and total number of transmitted quantum bits and classical bits;
2) the complexity of all related operations of a QS scheme.
The first factor is represented as the formula
η =
Bs
Qt +Bt
, (2)
where Bs = n, Qt, and Bt represent the number of signed message bits, transmitted quantum bits,
and exchanged classical bits, separately. Obviously, the bigger of the value of η, the higher of the
efficiency of a QS scheme. With respect to formula (2), the value of η in Zeng et al.’s scheme [12],
Li et al.’s scheme [13], Zou et al.’s scheme [14], Lee et al.’s scheme [15], Lu¨ et al.’s scheme [16],
and Wang’s scheme [18] is 6%, 7%, 11%, 12%, 11%, and 11%, respectively. The scheme proposed
by Gottesman and Chuang [11] and the one proposed by Lu¨ and Feng [17] are not efficient, since
they both employ quantum one-way functions and too many quantum bits are transmitted. Only
another scheme proposed by Wang et al.’ in [19] and the proposed scheme can sign messages of
any length by utilizing hash function to produce message digest.
About the other factor, a QS scheme is more efficient if less related operations are involved. As
for it, we compare the proposed scheme with other related schemes as follows. Zeng et al.’s scheme
[12] requires preparing and distributing GHZ states, and Li et al.’s scheme [13] needs prepara-
tion and distribution of Bell states. In addition, the two schemes both involve some complicated
quantum operations such as performing joint measurements, carrying out Bell measurements, and
comparing quantum states. Zou et al.’s scheme [14] and Wang et al.’s two schemes [18, 19] do
not need entangled states and just require performing von Neumann measurements. But in these
three schemes, the additional random secret bit string should be shared between the two partic-
ipants besides the keys shared between participants and the arbitrator in the initializing phase.
In addition, comparison of the qubit strings is still required. Lee et al.’s scheme [15] also requires
using GHZ states, measuring GHZ particles, and comparing qubit strings. Lu¨ et al.’s two schemes
[16, 17] are rather complicated due to usage of quantum stabilizer codes and syndromes. Besides,
all the previously presented arbitrated QS schemes [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] did not consider
how to use the key shared by the signatory and the arbitrator or by the receiver and the arbitrator
repeatedly. Each time when a signatory executes a sign, the signatory and the receiver have to
obtain a new key shared with the arbitrator via QKD protocols, thus efficiency of these schemes is
greatly decreased. While in the proposed QS scheme, entangled states are not necessary, comparing
qubit strings is omitted, and only von Neumann measurement is needed. Especially, the signatory
and the receiver can share a long-term key with the arbitrator by utilizing the key together with
a random number. Therefore, the efficiency of the proposed QS scheme is improved greatly.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an arbitrated QS scheme by combing quantum cryptographic and
classical cryptographic techniques. The proposed scheme is very efficient due to the following
merits: entangled states need not be prepared in advance; comparing qubits is not required; only
von Neumann measurements are necessary; especially, the signatory and the receiver can share a
long-term secret key with the arbitrator. In addition, we proved that the proposed QS is secure,
and especially provided a formal security proof of its existential unforgeability.
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Appendix
Here we give the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. If the keyed hash function h is (ε′, t′, q, n)-weakly collision-resistant, then the proposed
QS scheme is an (ε, t, qsig, qh, n)-secure QS scheme, and ε, ε
′, t, and t′ satisfy inequality
(1−
1
2n
) · ε ·
1
qsig + qh
≤ ε′,
where q ≤ qsig + qh, t
′ ≤ t+ q · Trn, Trn is the time for generating a random number.
Proof : Assume an adversary A who is restricted to make signature queries for at most qsig
times and hash queries up to qh times, has potential to produce a valid signature of a message
without being asked with probability greater than ε in the time bound t, then we can prove that a
challenger C can find collisions for the keyed hash function h with probability larger than ε′ within
t′ using this event, which is in contradict with that h is a (ε′, t′, q, n)-weakly collision-resistant hash
function.
• Set up: C lets KTU be the shared key between TC and U , chooses a random number
r(1 ≤ r ≤ qh + qsig), and sets the counter c = 0.
• Hash queries: A asks the value of h when inputting Pj . In order to respond to A’s queries,
C has to keep a hash table in which each element is a two tuple (Pj , wj) and the number
of elements before running the procedure is zero. At some time when A begins to request
the value of h corresponding to the input Pj , C increases the counter c by one and makes
different responses as follows:
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– If c < r, C sends Pj queried by A to the keyed hash function h. Then h returns
wj = h(rj , Pj) as a response. C keeps (Pj , wj) in the hash table and forwards wj to A.
– If c = r, C guesses that A may attempt to attack the QS scheme at the moment, so
he sends M of his own choice instead of Pj queried by A to h. h responds by offering
wj = h(rj ,M) to C. Then wj is forwarded to A.
– Otherwise, C loses the game and stops the currently running procedure.
• Signature queries: A asks the signature of message Pj . After setting the counter c = c+1, C
generates the signature |Sj〉 of message Pj according to KTU and sends it to A as a response.
• Output: A outputs a message-signature pair (Pi, |Si〉) and the signature query for Pi has not
been made before. C checks whether (Pi, wi) has been in the hash table. If not, C makes
a hash query procedure and adds the corresponding element to the hash table. If c 6= r, C
fails and terminates the procedure; else measures |Si〉 to get ri||Ri depending on KTU . If the
signature |Si〉 is valid, C calculates
wi||U = (Trucl(KTU )⊕ ri)⊕Ri,
and
wi = h(ri, Pi) = h(ri,M).
So C can output Pi. If |Si〉 is invalid, C loses the game and stops the procedure.
Assume A outputs a valid message-signature pair (Pi, |Si〉). Then if C wants to succeed in find
collisions, the following three conditions should be satisfied.
• Condition 1 (C1): when c = r, A makes a hash query instead of a signature query;
• Condition 2 (C2): the finally outputted message Pi should be queried when c = r;
• Condition 3 (C3): the output of C Pi is not equal to M .
The probability that C1 holds is P (C1) ≥ qh
qsig+qh
and the conditional probability P (C2|C1) ≥ 1
qh
since A may make illegal queries. In addition, due to the randomness of Pi, P (C3|C1, C2) ≈ 1−
1
2n
.
Therefore,
qh
qsig + qh
·
1
qh
· (1−
1
2n
) · ε = (1−
1
2n
) · ε ·
1
qsig + qh
≤ ε′,
where q ≤ qsig + qh, t
′ ≤ t+ q · Trn, Trn is the time to generate a random number. 
10
References
[1] S. Wiesner, Conjugate coding, SIGACT News 15 (1983) 78–88.
[2] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing, in: Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Computers Systems and Signal Processing, 1984, pp. 175–179.
[3] A. Ekert, Quantum cryptography based on bell’s theorem, Physical Review Letters 67 (1991) 661–664.
[4] C. H. Bennett, Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states, Physical Review Letters 68 (1992)
3121–3124.
[5] M. Hillery, V. Buzek, Quantum secret sharing, Physical Review A 59 (1999) 1829–1834.
[6] A. Karlsson, M. Koashi, N. Imoto, Quantum entanglement for secret sharing and secret splitting, Physical
Review A 59 (1999) 162–168.
[7] H. Barnum, C. Crepeau, D. Gottesman, A. Smith, A. Tapp, Authentication of quantum messages, in: Proceed-
ings of the 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002, pp. 449–458.
[8] H. K. Lo, H. F. Chau, Is quantum bit commitment really possible?, Physical Review Letters 78 (1997) 3410–3413.
[9] D. Mayers, Unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible, Physical Review Letters 78 (1997)
3414–3417.
[10] F. G. Deng, G. L. Long, Secure direct communication with a quantum one-time pad, Physical Review A 69
(2004) article no. 052319.
[11] D. Gottesman, I. L. Chuang, Quantum digital signatures, arXiv:quant-ph/0105032 (2001).
[12] G. H. Zeng, C. H. Keitel, Arbitrated quantum-signature scheme, Physical Review A 65 (2002) article no. 042312.
[13] Q. Li, W. H. Chan, D. Y. Long, Arbitrated quantum signature scheme using bell states, Physical Review A 79
(2009) article no. 054307.
[14] X. F. Zou, D. W. Qiu, Security analysis and improvements of arbitrated quantum signature schemes, Physical
Review A 82 (2010) article no. 042325.
[15] H. Lee, C. Hong, H. Kim, J. Lim, H. J. Yang, Arbitrated quantum signature scheme with message recovery,
Physics Letters A 321 (2004) 295–300.
[16] X. Lu¨, D. G. Feng, An arbitrated quantum message signature scheme, in: Proceedings of the 1st International
Symposium on Computational and Information Science, 2004, pp. 1054–1060.
[17] X. Lu¨, D. G. Feng, Quantum digital signature based on quantum one-way functions, in: Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology, 2005, pp. 514–517.
[18] J. Wang, Q. Zhang, C. J. Tang, Quantum signature scheme with message recovery, in: Proceedings of the 8th
International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology, 2006, pp. 1375–1378.
[19] J. Wang, Q. Zhang, C. J. Tang, Efficient quantum signature protocol of classical messages, Journal on Commu-
nications 28 (2007) 64–68, in Chinese.
[20] H. K. Lo, H. F. Chau, Unconditional security of quantum key distribution over arbitrarily long distances, Science
283 (1999) 2050–2056.
[21] P. W. Shor, J. Preskill, Simple proof of security of the bb84 quantum key distribution protocol, Physical Review
Letters 85 (2000) 441–444.
[22] H. Inamori, N. Lutkenhaus, D. Mayers, Unconditional security of practical quantum key distribution, The
European Physical Journal D 41 (2007) 599–627.
[23] P. W. Shor, Algorithms for quantum computation: Discrete logarithms and factoring, in: Proceedings of the
35th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1994, pp. 124–134.
[24] J. Wang, Q. Zhang, L. M. Liang, C. J. Tang, Comment on: “arbitrated quantum signature scheme with message
recovery”, Physics Letters A 347 (2005) 262–263.
[25] Q. Li, R. G. Du, D. Y. Long, C. J. Wang, W. H. Chan, Entanglement enhances the security of arbitrated
quantum signature, International Journal of Quantum Information 7 (2009) 913–925.
11
[26] G. H. Zeng, M. Lee, Y. Guo, G. Q. He, Continuous variable quantum signature algorithm, International Journal
of Quantum Information 5 (2007) 553–573.
[27] X. J. Wen, Y. Liu, Y. Sun, Quantum multi-signature protocol based on teleportation, Z Naturforsch A: Phys
Sci 62 (2007) 147–151.
[28] Y. G. Yang, Multi-proxy quantum group signature scheme with threshold shared verification, Chinese Physics
B 17 (2008) 415–418.
[29] Y. G. Yang, Q. Y. Wen, Quantum threshold group signature, Science in China Series G-Physics, Mechanics &
Astronomy 38 (2008) 1162–1170, in Chinese.
[30] T. Hwang, K. C. Lee, C. M. Li, Provably secure three-party authenticated quantum key distribution protocols,
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 4 (2007) 71–80.
[31] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, H. Krawczyk, Keying hash functions for message authentication, in: Advances In
Cryptology-Crypto’96, Vol. 1109 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 1996, pp. 1–15.
[32] G. Tsudik, Message authentication with one-way hash functions, ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review 22 (5) (1992) 29–38.
[33] W. K. Wootters, W. H. Zurek, A single quantum cannot be cloned, Nature 299 (1982) 802–803.
[34] M. A. Nielsen, I. L. Chuang, Quantum computation and quantum information, Higher Education, Beijing, 2003.
[35] M. Bellare, P. Rogaway, Provably secure session key distribution-the three party case, in: Proceedings of the
27th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1995, pp. 57–66.
[36] D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, Security proofs for signature schemes, in: Advances In Cryptology-Eurocrypt’96, Vol.
1070 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 1996, pp. 387–398.
[37] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, R. Rivest, A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks,
SIAM Journal on Computing 17 (1988) 281–308.
12
